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1INTEREST OF THE AMICI STATES
Amici,1 the States of California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa,
Maryland, New York, Oregon, and Vermont2 have a vested interest in
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens, interests that are
advanced through the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 20103
(“ACA”).  Moreover, as sovereign States, Amici have a vital interest in
ensuring that constitutional principles of federalism are respected by the
federal government, as they are here.
As part of their responsibility to help provide access to affordable care
for their citizens, Amici have engaged in varied, creative, and determined
state-by-state efforts to expand and improve health insurance coverage in
their States and to contain healthcare costs.  Despite some successes, these
state-by-state efforts have fallen short.  As a consequence, Amici have
concluded that a national solution, embracing principles of cooperative
federalism, is necessary.
1 Amici file this brief pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
29(a).
2 Although Massachusetts has filed a brief detailing its unique
experience with its health care reform, it agrees with the arguments set forth
in this brief.
3 The ACA refers to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Public Law 111–148 and the Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Public Law 111–152.
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2California’s dire situation illustrates the problems facing Amici.  In
2009, more than 7.2 million Californians—nearly one in four people under
the age of 65—lacked insurance for all or part of the year.  More than 5.5
million Californians who could not afford private insurance were enrolled in
government-sponsored health plans, which will cost the State a projected
$42 billion in the next fiscal year.  Of those funds, $27.1 billion comes from
the General Fund, which faces a $25 billion deficit.
Oregon and Maryland too are grappling with the spiraling cost of
medical care and health insurance.  Despite a variety of legislative efforts to
increase access to insurance coverage, 21.8% of Oregonians and 16.1% of
Marylanders lack health insurance.  The Urban Institute has predicted that
without comprehensive healthcare reform, 27.4% of Oregonians and 20.2%
of Marylanders will lack health insurance by 2019.  In 2009, Oregon spent
$2.6 billion on Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program.
Without comprehensive healthcare reform, the cost is expected to double to
$5.5 billion by 2019.
The ACA provides important tools for the States, in partnership with
the federal government, to provide their citizens needed access to affordable
and reliable healthcare.  The law strikes an appropriate—and
constitutional—balance between national requirements that will expand
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3access to affordable healthcare while providing States with flexibility to
design programs that achieve that goal for their citizens.  Amici urge this
Court to reverse the decision of the district court and uphold this necessary
law.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The ACA represents a reasonable means of grappling with the United
States’ healthcare crisis.  The minimum coverage provision, which requires
non-exempt adults to maintain adequate health coverage, is but one part of a
comprehensive healthcare reform law intended to increase Americans’
access to affordable healthcare.  The ACA relies in large part on an
expansion of the current market for health insurance, building upon existing
state and federal partnerships to improve access to and the quality of
healthcare in the United States.
Although the minimum coverage provision requires individuals to
purchase health insurance, most people will continue to receive coverage
through their employer or through expanded access to Medicaid.  The ACA
expands the number of employers who offer insurance to their workers by
requiring businesses with more than fifty employees to begin providing
health insurance in 2014.  ACA § 1513.  Small businesses have already
started taking advantage of the significant tax breaks intended to encourage
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4such expansion, including some of the 333,000 businesses eligible in the
Fourth Circuit.  ACA § 1421.4   The ACA also expands access to Medicaid
to individuals who earn less than 133 percent of the federal poverty level,
and funds 100 percent of the cost until 2017.  ACA § 2001(a).  California
was one of the first States to obtain a waiver from the federal government
that allows it to offer this expanded coverage to Californians prior to 2014.5
Finally, for those individuals who do not obtain health insurance from
their employer or from government-run plans, the ACA makes affordable
coverage more readily available.  It eliminates annual and lifetime caps on
health insurance benefits so that individuals maintain coverage during a
catastrophic illness.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11.  The ACA authorizes States to
create health insurance exchanges that will allow individuals, families, and
small businesses to leverage their collective bargaining power to obtain
more competitive prices and benefits.  42 U.S.C. § 18031.  Maryland, for
instance, has already received two grants totaling $7.2 million to support its
4 http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/count_per_state_for_
special_post_card_notice.pdf (last accessed Feb. 27, 2011).
5 California Department of Healthcare Services, California Bridge to
Reform: A Section 1105 Waiver (Nov. 2010).
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5implementation of this provision.6  The ACA provides tax incentives for
low-income individuals to purchase their own insurance through insurance
exchanges.  ACA § 1401.  Starting in 2014, the ACA prohibits insurance
companies from refusing to cover individuals with preexisting conditions.
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3.  A significant number of individuals who are
uninsured are unable to purchase insurance or are required to pay higher
premiums due to a preexisting condition, which can include common
illnesses such as heart disease, cancer, asthma, or even pregnancy.7  The
ACA will thus dramatically increase the availability of insurance for
previously uninsurable individuals.
One component of these comprehensive reforms is the minimum
coverage provision, which requires that an applicable individual maintain
“minimum essential coverage” each month.  ACA § 1501.  Minimum
essential coverage includes Medicare or Medicaid, an employer-sponsored
plan, or a plan offered through a health insurance exchange. Id.  As
discussed below, the minimum coverage provision is important for two
6 http://www.healthcare.gov/center/states/md.html (last accessed Feb.
27, 2011).
7 Karen Pollitz, Richard Sorian, and Kathy Thomas, How Accessible
is Individual Health Insurance for Consumers in Less-Than-Perfect Health?
(Report to the Kaiser Family Foundation June 2001).
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6reasons.  First, it ensures that individuals take responsibility for their own
care rather than shifting those costs to society.  Second, the elimination of
caps on benefits and the requirement that insurance companies insure
individuals with preexisting conditions are unsustainable if participants in
the healthcare market are allowed to postpone purchasing insurance until an
acute need arises.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the authority to enact the
minimum coverage provision, as it substantially affects interstate commerce
and is essential to the proper application of the ACA.  The Supreme Court
has recognized three broad categories of activities Congress may regulate
consistent with its authority “to regulate commerce,” including (1) “the use
of the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce,” and (3) “activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
Although the Supreme Court has in the past addressed the scope of
“activities” that Congress may regulate, it has never suggested that a
distinction between activity and inactivity exists or that it is a relevant
inquiry for purposes of the Commerce Clause.
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7Rather, the minimum coverage provision is included in Congress’s
power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
Exercising this power, Congress may regulate economic activities that, in
the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).  In addition, Congress may
regulate noneconomic activity so long as the regulation is “an essential part
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” Lopez, 514
U.S. at 561.  The minimum coverage provision is a justifiable exercise of
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because (1) the aggregate effect of
maintaining a minimum level of insurance coverage has a substantial effect
on commerce, and (2) the comprehensive solution to health insurance reform
would be undercut without the minimum coverage provision.
Moreover, the minimum coverage provision is also justified by the
Necessary and Proper Clause.  Not only is the minimum coverage provision
necessary, it is a proper exercise of federal authority that does not alter the
essential attributes of state sovereignty.  Indeed, identical arguments were
made and rejected when Congress first began regulating conditions of labor
and when it passed the Social Security Act.
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8ARGUMENT
I. CONGRESS POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE TO ENACT THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION
A. As a Threshold Matter, the Distinction Between Activity
and Inactivity Is Illusory and Has No Basis in Commerce
Clause Precedent.
Regardless of whether the minimum coverage provision is seen to
regulate activity or “inactivity,” it is within Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce.  In arguing that the minimum coverage provision is
outside the bounds of the Commerce Clause, Virginia does not question the
substantial effects that the failure to purchase insurance has on interstate
commerce, but rather argues that the decision not to purchase health
insurance is “inactivity” that could not be regulated by Congress.  (Dist. Ct.
Paper No. 89 at 16.)  The supposed distinction between “activity” and
“inactivity,” however, is illusory, and has no basis in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
Many regulated activities could conceivably be characterized as
“inactivity,” illustrating the false distinction between the two.  For instance,
the failure to comply with draft registration requirements, 50 U.S.C. App.
451 et seq., can be viewed as inaction or as an affirmative act of
disobedience.  The failure to appear for federal jury duty as required by 28
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9U.S.C. § 1854(b) can likewise be characterized as “inactivity” rather than as
an affirmative action to evade jury service.  As Justice Scalia has observed,
“[e]ven as a legislative matter…the intelligent line does not fall between
action and inaction.” Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 296 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Judge Kessler of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia reached a similar conclusion in
granting the government’s motion to dismiss a related suit:
It is pure semantics to argue that an individual who
makes a choice to forego health insurance is not
“acting,” especially given the serious economic and
health-related consequences to every individual of that
choice.  Making a choice is an affirmative action,
whether one decides to do something or not do
something.  To pretend otherwise is to ignore reality.
Mead v. Holder, 2011 WL 61139, *18 (D.D.C.  Feb. 22, 2011).  The
distinction between activity and inactivity carries no analytical weight and
does not furnish a proper basis for determining the scope of congressional
power.
The distinction between activity and inactivity also has no basis in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Virginia notes that Supreme Court cases
construing the limits of the Commerce Clause power refer to economic
activity, and concludes from this observation that Congress can regulate only
activity, not inactivity.  (Dist. Ct. Paper No. 89 at 5, 13, 16.)  That argument
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improperly elevates descriptive statements into a holding.  The Court’s
discussions of “economic activity” in those cases were not focused on
whether the law at issue regulated activity rather than inactivity, but on
whether the activity was economic or noneconomic in nature.8 See, e.g.,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (“Both petitioners and
Justice Souter’s dissent downplay the role that the economic nature of the
regulated activity plays in our Commerce Clause analysis.  But a fair reading
of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue
was central to our decision in that case.”).  Thus, the proper question is not
whether the decision refusing to purchase health insurance is “action” or
“inaction,” but rather whether, in the aggregate, such decisions substantially
affect interstate commerce.  There can be no doubt that they do.
8 Similarly, some argued that Congress could not regulate local
manufacture prior to transit because Supreme Court decisions discussing the
Commerce Clause had, prior to that point, addressed only the regulation of
goods in transit.  The Court ultimately rejected the distinction between the
two.  As Robert Stern observed, “‘the Court talked about movement because
that was all that was needed to talk about to decide the cases before it,’ and
not because it meant to limit the scope of federal power.”  Mark A. Hall,
Commerce Clause Challenges to Healthcare Reform, 159 U. Penn. L. Rev.
at ___ (forthcoming June 2011), available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1747189 (quoting Robert L. Stern, That Commerce
Which Concerns More States than One, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335, 1361
(1934)).
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11
B. Decisions Whether to Purchase Health Insurance Have a
Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce That
Congress May Directly Regulate.
The decision whether to maintain health insurance coverage has a
“substantial relation to interstate commerce,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, and is
a permissible exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  In
deciding to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, Congress may consider the aggregate effects of those activities.
“When Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a
threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.” Raich, 545 U.S.
at 17.  This Court need not determine whether the decision to purchase
health insurance substantially affects interstate commerce when considered
in the aggregate, but “only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so
concluding.” Id. at 22 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).  Here, Congress
had a rational basis for concluding that individuals’ decisions not to
purchase health insurance, but rather to pay (or attempt to pay) for their
medical care only at the time such care is delivered has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.
As Secretary Sebelius demonstrates in her brief (p. 31-33), the
minimum coverage provision has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Everyone requires healthcare at some point.  Individuals who lack health
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insurance, however, shift two-thirds of the cost of their care to state and
local officials, amounting to $43 billion nationally in 2008 at a cost of $455
per individual or $1,186 per family each year in California.9  Maryland has
developed a unique regulatory framework that seeks to ensure that such cost-
shifting occurs as equitably as possible.  The State’s Health Services Cost
Review Commission, a hospital rate-setting body, authorizes the State’s
hospitals to impose a fee on all patients to reimburse hospitals for the costs
associated with providing care to the uninsured.  In 2009, when Maryland
hospitals provided a total of $999 million in uncompensated care, 6.91% of
the charge for any visit to a Maryland hospital reflected a Commission-
approved add-on charge to reimburse the hospital for the cost of providing
uncompensated care.  In other words, a fixed and substantial portion of
every Maryland hospital-patient’s bill reflects the shifting of costs from
supposedly “inactive” individuals to the patient population as a whole.
Requiring individuals to possess health insurance ends this cost-shifting,
lowering the costs of healthcare for everyone and reducing the costs to the
States of providing such care.  The minimum coverage provision will greatly
9 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F); Peter Harbage and Len Nichols, A
Premium Price: The Hidden Costs All Californians Pay in Our Fragmented
Healthcare System (New America Foundation, Dec. 2006).
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reduce the need to compensate hospitals for uncompensated care, either
directly as Maryland does, or indirectly as is the case in California and most
States.  The direct impact on interstate commerce described in the
Secretary’s brief is sufficient to justify Congress’s exercise of its Commerce
Clause authority.
C. The Minimum Coverage Provision Regulates an Essential
Part of a Larger Economic Activity.
The minimum coverage provision is also justified as “an essential part
of a larger regulation” of the health insurance industry. Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561.   It cannot be doubted that Congress has the constitutional authority to
regulate the health insurance industry. See United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (Congress possesses Commerce Clause
authority to regulate insurance).  Indeed, Congress has regulated the health
insurance market for decades. See Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) (Pub. L. 93-406); Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA) (Pub. L. 99-272); Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (Pub. L. 104-191).
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The market for medical services is national in scope, and accounts for
17 percent of the United States’s gross domestic product, or $2.5 trillion.10
Congress found that spending for health insurance exceeded $850 billion in
2009.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2).  As Congress recognized, medical supplies,
drugs, and equipment used in the provision of healthcare routinely cross
state lines.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(B).  Many hospital corporations operate
in numerous states: the Hospital Corporation of America, for instance,
operates 164 hospitals and 106 freestanding surgery centers in 20 states.11
Moreover, Congress found that the majority of health insurance is sold by
national or regional companies.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(B).
As Secretary Sebelius explains in her brief (p. 34–39), the minimum
coverage provision is an essential part of the ACA’s attempt to provide
healthcare access to individuals with preexisting conditions, a group that is
among the hardest of the uninsured to cover.  The requirement that
companies insure individuals with preexisting conditions creates a moral
hazard: individuals could simply wait until they are sick to purchase health
insurance.  Left unmitigated, this “adverse selection” creates an insurance
10 Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2009 National Health
Expenditure Data, table 3.
11 http://www.hcahealthcare.com/about/ (last accessed March 5,
2011).
Case: 11-1057     Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 24
15
pool that poses an extremely high risk from an insurer’s perspective, since
individuals who are ill or at high risk of becoming ill will disproportionally
purchase health insurance while healthy individuals will remain outside the
system.  To prevent insurance companies from being forced to raise
premiums to account for this risk, Congress enacted the minimum coverage
provision, which prevents freeloaders from refusing to pay for insurance
when they know they can buy it when it is needed.
This provision has the additional effect of reducing the need to shift the
cost of uncompensated care given to those without insurance onto the States
and responsible individuals who have health insurance. See supra at 12–13.
As a result of the minimum coverage provision, California will no longer be
forced to pay the 5-7 percent of public hospitals’ operating expenses that
resulted from treating uninsured individuals.12  Nor will Maryland be forced
to add a 7 percent surcharge to all hospital bills to cover such
uncompensated care.  The minimum coverage provision will help reduce the
almost $43 billion spent nationally on uncompensated care, 42 U.S.C. §
18091(a)(2)(F), and is necessary to the proper functioning of the requirement
that insurance companies insure those with preexisting conditions.  It is the
12 California HealthCare Foundation, California’s Healthcare Safety
Net: Facts and Figures at 19 (Oct. 2010)
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sort of noneconomic regulation that is essential to a larger regulation of
economic activity (the health insurance market generally) that Congress may
regulate. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
D. The Minimum Coverage Provision is a Necessary and
Proper Means to Regulate the Health Insurance Market.
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause is augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which allows Congress to “make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” the powers
enumerated in the Constitution.  U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.  As Justice Scalia
has explained, the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to
“regulate even those intrastate activities that do not substantially affect
interstate commerce” as well as “noneconomic local activity” where
necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective. Raich, 545
U.S. at 35, 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Thus, even if the requirement that an
individual maintain a minimum level of coverage were not considered
economic, it is still within Congress’s power since it is necessary to lower
the cost of health insurance and to effectuate the ban on denying coverage
based on preexisting conditions.  In rejecting application of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, the district court concluded that the minimum coverage
provision was not “tethered to a lawful exercise of an enumerated power”
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and that the provision “is neither within the letter nor the spirit of the
Constitution.”  (Dist. Ct. Paper No. 161 at 24.)  This conclusion reflects a
misunderstanding of the purpose and function of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
1. The Minimum Coverage Provision Furthers
Congress’s Exercise of Its Commerce Clause
Authority.
The minimum coverage provision is in fact tethered to a valid exercise
of congressional authority: Congress’s power to regulate commerce.  It is
beyond dispute that the ACA as a whole, which regulates the $2.5 trillion
national healthcare market, is within Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress “possesses every power
needed to make that regulation effective.” United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118–19 (1942).  Such power is necessarily in
addition to whatever enumerated power Congress possesses.  It is axiomatic
that Congress possesses the authority to use all appropriate means adapted to
legitimate ends. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819).  To
suggest that Congress must possess some enumerated power to justify the
exercise of authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause would render
that clause meaningless.
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Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether “the means chosen are
‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the
commerce power.” United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010).
In making this determination, courts must give Congress “a large discretion
as to the means that may be employed in executing a given power.” Lottery
Case, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903).  The end here is clearly legitimate: to
reduce the expense of healthcare, which in 2008 accounted for
approximately $2.5 trillion, or 17.6%, of the nation’s economy, and to
expand access to health insurance as the federal government has been doing
since the passage of the Social Security Act in 1965.  So too are the means
reasonably adapted to this legitimate end.  As explained above, supra at 14–
15, the minimum coverage provision helps eliminate the problem of adverse
selection created by expanding the insurance pool and results in reduced
insurance premiums and lower costs of healthcare.
2. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a “Proper”
Exercise of Congressional Authority
In addition to being necessary, the minimum coverage provision is also
proper.  Virginia’s primary argument as to why the Necessary and Proper
Clause does not apply is that the power to enact the minimum coverage
provision “would alter the federal structure of the Constitution by creating
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an unlimited federal power indistinguishable from a national police power.”
(Dist. Ct. Paper No. 89, at 5–6.)  This concern dramatically overstates the
authority being claimed by the federal government, and dramatically
understates the extent to which the federal government already regulates a
significant portion of the health insurance market.
In Comstock, the Supreme Court rejected a Tenth Amendment
limitation on the Necessary and Proper Clause much along the lines of what
Virginia urges here.  The Supreme Court concluded that the “powers
‘delegated to the United States by the Constitution’ include those
specifically enumerated powers listed in Article I along with the
implementation authority granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Virtually by definition, these powers are not powers that the Constitution
‘reserved to the States.’” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962.
Justice Kennedy concurred, expressing his view that “whether essential
attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause” should be a consideration in
determining whether a power is properly within the federal government’s
reach. Id. at 1967–68.  Justice Kennedy identified three examples where the
Necessary and Proper Clause should be limited: instances “in which the
National Government demands that a State use its own governmental system
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to implement federal commands”; “in which the National Government
relieves the States of their own primary responsibility to enact laws and
policies for the safety and well being of their citizens”; or “in which the
exercise of national power intrudes upon functions and duties traditionally
committed to the State.” Id. at 1968.  None of these apply here.
a. The Minimum Coverage Provision Does Not
Require States to Implement Federal
Commands.
First, the Act does not commandeer the States to implement a federal
program.  To the contrary, the ACA provides States substantial ability to
experiment with their own methods of improving their citizens’ access to
affordable healthcare.  Indeed, the ACA is a prime example of cooperative
federalism that the Supreme Court has concluded is within Congressional
authority. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).  For
instance, the ACA gives States broad latitude to establish health insurance
exchanges in a manner that States determine best meet the needs of their
citizens, subject to minimum federal standards.  42 U.S.C. § 18041(b).
Even those standards may be waived if a State wishes to provide access to
health insurance in a different way. Id. § 18052.  Or a State may decline to
establish an exchange at all. Id. § 18041(c).
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Similarly, the ACA allows States great latitude in establishing basic
health programs for low-income individuals who are not eligible for
Medicaid.  States may implement new coverage programs for individuals
and families with incomes between 133% and 200% of the poverty line.   42
U.S.C. § 18051.  If a State chooses to implement these programs, their
citizens would be able to choose a plan under contract with the State instead
of one offered in the insurance exchange. Id.  The State would receive
federal funds to operate such a program equal to 95% of the subsidies that
would have gone to providing coverage for this group in the exchange. Id.
§ 18051(d)(3).  States may also enter into healthcare choice compacts in
which two or more States establish such a program. Id. § 18053.  Or again,
a State may choose not to establish such a program and instead allow their
citizens to access health insurance exchanges operated by the federal
government.
b. States Maintain Primary Responsibility to
Protect their Citizens.
Second, the ACA does not relieve States of their primary responsibility
to enact laws and policies for the safety and well-being of their citizens.
States may choose to enact further reforms to improve over the federal
reforms contained in the ACA, much as Massachusetts has done with its
Case: 11-1057     Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 31
22
landmark healthcare reform law that has served as a model for many of the
reforms instituted by the ACA.  Indeed, the ACA gives States additional
authority to regulate insurance companies.  Under the authority to review
any increases in the premiums set by insurance companies, California passed
a law requiring all premium filings to be reviewed and certified by an
independent actuary to ensure that premium costs are accurately calculated.
Cal. Stats. 2010, Ch. 661.
c. The ACA Does Not Intrude in an Area
Typically Committed to State Control
Third, the ACA does not intrude in an area that has historically been
committed solely to the States.  While States retain wide latitude to regulate
the standards of medical care and the provision of health insurance, the
federal government has maintained a presence in the health insurance arena
for decades.  A prime example is Medicaid, through which the state and
federal governments cooperate in order to extend coverage to children,
pregnant mothers, and the disabled who are below the federal poverty level.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i).  Using federal and state funds, States
administer Medicaid according to a plan that is approved by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. Id. § 1396a(b).  States, within federal
guidelines, determine which benefits the State will offer, how much doctors
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are paid, and how the program will operate.  Congress’s continued
involvement in the health insurance market is nothing new.
Aside from Medicaid, Congress has regulated large aspects of the
insurance market since the passage of ERISA in 1974.  ERISA regulates the
provision of employer-sponsored health plans, and limits the ability of
insurance companies to deny coverage to individuals with preexisting
conditions.  29 U.S.C. § 1181.  ERISA also sets minimum standards for
certain aspects of employer-sponsored health insurance, such as
requirements for minimum hospital stays following the birth of a child, and
parity in mental health and substance abuse benefits. Id. §§ 1185(a), 1185a.
Congress has twice revisited its regulation of health insurance since then.
Passed in 1986, COBRA requires that employers continue to offer health
insurance to individuals and their dependents that otherwise might be
terminated, such as if an individual loses his or her job. Id. §§ 1161 et seq.
HIPAA, passed in 1996, set federal requirements for maintaining the privacy
of medical information, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 et seq. and further limited the
exclusion of individuals with preexisting health conditions, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1181.
Since the establishment of Medicaid in 1965 and the passage of ERISA
in 1974, the federal government has been actively involved in the regulation
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of the health insurance market.  While the ACA represents an expansion of
the federal government’s presence, it is not a usurpation of an area
traditionally left to state regulation alone.
d. Federal Intervention is Needed to Reform the
Health Insurance Market.
Because of the national scope of healthcare and its importance to the
national economy, States are unable to solve the problem of the uninsured
without the assistance of the federal government.  Most people obtain their
healthcare through their employers, and States’ attempts to reform the
healthcare market come at great risk:  a state’s requirement that employers
offer health insurance could lead to businesses moving to other States.
Similarly, the regulation of insurance practices by a single State may make
insurance companies reluctant to offer policies there.  That is an especially
powerful concern when a single insurance company provides coverage for
the majority of individuals in a State, such as in Alabama, where the largest
carrier has a 96% market share.13  Moreover, a State that offered especially
generous benefits could see individuals move to that State to take advantage
13 Letter from United States Government Accountability Office to
Sen. Snowe, Private Health Insurance: 2008 Survey Results on Number and
Market Share of Carriers in the Small Group Health Insurance Market (Feb.
27, 2009).
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of those benefits, increasing the State’s financial burden.   When Congress
regulates the insurance industry on a national basis, these problems are
greatly reduced.
Similar motivations caused Congress to regulate the labor market in the
early 20th century.  The Supreme Court initially determined that such efforts
were outside Congress’s Commerce Clause powers in a series of decisions
that have since been discredited. See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co,
259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating congressional efforts to regulate child
labor).  The Court ultimately recognized that interstate competition would
render efforts by individual States inadequate, and that national standards
were needed. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122–23 (1941).  Like
decisions invalidating Congress’s attempts to reform labor practices,
arguments that the minimum coverage provision are not within Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers represent a myopic view of that authority.
States’ efforts to regulate the health insurance market illustrate the need
for congressional action.  Maryland, like many states, has undertaken
substantial efforts to address these problems, and it has made significant
gains.  In 2008, Maryland dramatically expanded its Medicaid program,
raising the eligibility ceiling for parents and caretakers of dependent children
from 30% to 116% of the federal poverty level.  As a result of this expansion,
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the State’s Medicaid program now provides coverage to approximately
74,000 Marylanders who would otherwise lack insurance.  In 2002, the State
created the Maryland Health Insurance Plan (MHIP), which provides
coverage to Marylanders who are ineligible for Medicare or Medicaid and
who have been deemed medically uninsurable by private carriers.  Today,
MHIP insures about 20,000 Maryland residents who would be assured of
access to health insurance under the ACA starting in 2014.
While Maryland’s efforts have been beneficial, these programs have
come at a high cost, and have only reduced, not removed, the barriers to
affordable care.  Despite the State’s expansion of its Medicaid program and
its introduction of MHIP, 16.1% of Marylanders still lack health insurance,
similar to the figure for the country as a whole.  In 2009, the State’s
hospitals provided $999 million in uncompensated care to those without
insurance.  Moreover, the expansion of Maryland’s Medicaid program to a
substantial number of additional low-income parents is expected to cost the
State $498 million in the 2012 fiscal year.  To provide benefits to MHIP’s
high-risk pool of enrollees, MHIP charges premiums substantially higher
than those charged in the private market, and, in addition, the State imposes
a 0.8% assessment on the net patient revenues of all Maryland hospitals to
support MHIP.  In the face of unexpectedly high demand for coverage and
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the high cost of claims, MHIP was forced, between 2006 and 2010, to
increase premiums by about 40% for most of its membership and to institute
new benefit caps and to lower existing ones.  Notwithstanding the Plan’s
objective to provide insurance for otherwise uninsurable individuals, in 2007
MHIP was compelled to begin excluding coverage for benefits for
preexisting conditions during the first six months of an enrollee’s
participation in the Plan.
Maryland’s efforts illustrate the limits of States’ ability to grapple with
the national healthcare crisis, and the role that cooperative federalism can
play in helping States increase their citizens’ access to affordable health
insurance.  The ACA provides additional funds for Maryland to expand its
Medicaid program, and allows for waivers should Maryland, or any other
State, seek to do more.  The ACA’s prohibition on insurance companies’
practice of excluding individuals with preexisting conditions reduces the
need for MHIP and for the surcharge hospitals pay to support the Plan.
e. Upholding the Minimum Coverage Provision
Will Not Provide the Federal Government with
a General Police Power.
Sustaining the power of Congress to require individuals to maintain
adequate health insurance would not give the federal government a general
police power.  First, existing precedent provides constraints on congressional
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power that preclude Congress from exercising a national police power now
and in the future.  Regardless of whether the authority to enact the minimum
coverage provision is found in the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and
Proper Clause, a decision sustaining its constitutionality would be based on
the fact that the provision either directly affects interstate commerce or that
it is necessary to support such a direct regulation.  A ruling that
acknowledges this direct link to interstate commerce poses no risk that the
federal government will occupy traditional areas of authority reserved to the
States.
Second, in advancing the “slippery slope” argument, Virginia seeks a
decision striking down an existing, validly-enacted statute on the basis of the
possible future enactment of an unconstitutional statute.   This is not a valid
basis for challenging the ACA’s constitutionality.  The mere potential that
Congress could attempt to enact an unconstitutional law in the future is an
insufficient reason to invalidate the ACA today.  Frederick Schauer, Slippery
Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1985).
Third, for all of the controversy surrounding the ACA, it is not
fundamentally different from other federal programs that have been in
existence for decades.  The federal government has helped provide access to
health insurance for large segments of the population through Medicare and
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Medicaid.  It has regulated the provision of healthcare through employer-
sponsored plans through ERISA, which governs how most Americans obtain
health insurance.  The ACA is conceptually no different from Social
Security, which is in effect a federally-required retirement-insurance
program.  In both instances, Congress requires payment over time to avoid
the social and economic costs of individuals who are unable or unwilling to
prepare for retirement or for a catastrophic illness.
Indeed, the Social Security Act was also challenged as an incursion on
States’ prerogatives.14  The Supreme Court’s rejection of that argument is so
compelling in the context of the debate over the ACA that it bears repeating:
The problem is plainly national in area and dimensions.
Moreover, laws of the separate states cannot deal with it
effectively. Congress, at least, had a basis for that belief.
States and local governments are often lacking in the
resources that are necessary to finance an adequate
program of security for the aged. . . . Apart from the
failure of resources, states and local governments are at
times reluctant to increase so heavily the burden of
14 Congress also possesses the authority to enact the minimum
coverage provision under Congress’s taxing power: only taxpayers are
subject to the tax penalty imposed for failure to maintain a minimum level of
coverage; the penalty is calculated by reference to an individual’s income
and is included in that individuals’ tax return; the IRS collects the penalty
and enforces the minimum coverage provision; and the $4 billion in
projected annual revenues are used to fund other provisions of the ACA. Cf.
Sozninsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).
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taxation to be borne by their residents for fear of placing
themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as
compared with neighbors or competitors. . . . A system
of old age pensions has special dangers of its own, if put
in force in one state and rejected in another. The
existence of such a system is a bait to the needy and
dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and
seek a haven of repose. Only a power that is national
can serve the interests of all.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937).  The same thing could be said
of the healthcare crisis currently gripping the States and the nation.  The
ACA no more intrudes on state sovereignty than did the Social Security Act.
As States, Amici are fiercely protective of their sovereignty, and have a
vital role in ensuring that the balance of power between the state and federal
governments reflected in the Constitution is rigidly maintained.  The ACA
does nothing to disturb that balance.  Rather, it provides States with the
necessary tools to ensure that their citizens have access to affordable medical
care in a healthcare market that is truly national in scope.
II. THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS SEVERABLE FROM THE
REMAINDER OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT15
For the reasons set forth above, Amici strongly believe that the
minimum coverage provision is well within Congress’s powers under the
15 The arguments in this portion of the brief address the cross-appeal
in No. 11-1058.
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Commerce Clause, and that it does not interfere with traditional areas of
State sovereignty.  Should this Court conclude that Congress lacked
authority to enact the minimum coverage provision, however, it should
affirm the decision of the district court severing that provision and
provisions making reference to it from the ACA.  “The standard for
determining the severability of an unconstitutional provision is well
established: ‘[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that
which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative
as a matter of law.’” Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 108 (1976)).  In making this determination, the Court must determine
whether the remainder of the ACA is capable of functioning independently.
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
Although the ban on denying coverage based on a preexisting condition
is dependent on the minimum coverage provision, the vast majority of the
ACA can function as intended by Congress without it.  California has taken
a lead in implementing many of these provisions even before the minimum
coverage provision takes effect in 2014, showing that these provisions, and
many others, can operate independently.  For instance, California has
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enacted legislation implementing the ACA’s ban on denying coverage of
children based on preexisting conditions, as well as its requirement that
insurance plans cover dependent children who are 25 or under.  2010 Cal.
Stat., Ch. 656 and 660.  California has also passed legislation that prohibits a
person’s health insurance policyholder from canceling insurance once the
enrollee is covered unless there is a demonstration of fraud or intentional
misrepresentation of material fact.  2010 Cal. Stat., Ch. 658.
The ACA contains numerous provisions aimed at improving the quality
of healthcare that do not depend on the minimum coverage provision.  For
instance, Title V of the ACA provides new incentives to expand the number
of primary care doctors, nurses, and physician assistants through
scholarships and loan repayment programs.  Title IV of the ACA, on the
other hand, contains provisions aimed at preventing illness in the first
instance.   It requires insurance companies to offer certain preventive
services, and authorizes $15 billion for a new Prevention and Public Health
Fund, which will support initiatives from smoking cessation to fighting
obesity.  42 U.S.C. § 300u-11.  The ACA also includes $4 billion in funding
for two programs aimed at moving Medicaid beneficiaries out of institutions
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and into their own homes or other community settings. 16  One of these
programs was enacted during George W. Bush’s presidency, and was re-
authorized by the ACA.  ACA § 2403.  Recently, the Department of Health
and Human Services announced the first round of grants totaling $621
million, including over $22 million allocated to West Virginia.17  Since this
program was in effect before the ACA was enacted, it can clearly exist
independently of the minimum coverage provision.
Finally, the ACA contains important consumer protections that will
assist Amici in their duty to protect individuals from abusive practices of
insurance companies.  In addition to barring the practice of insurance
companies rescinding coverage, the ACA allows consumers to appeal
coverage determinations, and establishes an external review process to
examine those decisions.  California has already implemented a provision
that expands consumer assistance programs and has received $3.4 million to
enhance the capacity of existing consumer assistance networks and to
provide assistance with filing complaints and/or appeals of adverse coverage
16 http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/02/20110222b.html (last
accessed Feb. 27, 2011).
17 See note 15.
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decisions.18  California has also received a $1 million grant to implement a
provision of the ACA that grants States the authority to review premium
increases.  Each of these provisions is completely independent of the
minimum coverage provision, as the district court recognized.  Accordingly,
should this Court invalidate the minimum coverage provision, it should
leave the vast majority of the ACA intact.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court should be reversed.
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